I. Introduction: Dystopian Science Fiction and the Genealogy of Governmental Technologies

In twenty-first-century digital society, technology cannot be understood merely as a tool or a neutral medium. Data infrastructures, algorithmic systems, and platform networks organize communication, information flows, and social relations while continuously regulating individual behavior. Contemporary society is not governed solely by direct repression or coercion as it once was. Instead, individuals voluntarily participate in digital systems, expose their own information, and are encouraged to manage themselves according to the norms demanded by platforms. Thus, technological development signifies not merely mechanical progress but also a transformation in the modes of governance themselves.

Existing scholarship on dystopian fiction has made important contributions by examining totalitarianism, surveillance, technological domination, biopolitics, cyberpunk aesthetics, posthuman embodiment, and platform capitalism. After Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) by George Orwell, especially, dystopian criticism has tended to interpret surveillance and control primarily through the framework of ‘repressive power.’ However, in contemporary digital capitalist society, power no longer functions merely through prohibition and coercion. Today, power penetrates individual desire, participation, and self-management, leading people to govern themselves. In other words, modern power is defined not by external coercion, but by the production of self-governance.

In the case of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, critics have often emphasized the novel’s critique of totalitarian ideology and state-centered control. Shahin Hossain, for instance, reads the novel as a cautionary tale about totalitarian ideology, arguing that the World State controls both body and mind through Pavlovian conditioning, sexual regulation, and propaganda. Similarly, biopolitical readings of Brave New World focus on the scientific and administrative management of life. Barış Ağır, for example, argues that Huxley’s novel represents a biopolitical order in which the human body becomes the object of biological regulation through reproductive technology, medicalization, and the management of sexuality. These studies clarify how Huxley’s dystopia transforms life itself into an object of political administration.

Scholarship on William Gibson’s Neuromancer has developed around cyberpunk, cyberspace, posthumanism, and late capitalism. For example, Claire Sponsler’s influential discussion situates cyberpunk within the dilemmas of postmodern narrative, and Timo Siivonen examines the relationship between body and technology in Gibson’s cyberspace fiction. More recent criticism continues to interpret Neuromancer through the lens of posthuman entities, cybernetic subjectivity, and late capitalist technoculture. For example, Jiheon Lee examines cyberspace, cybernetics, and posthuman beings in relation to the techno-cultural logic of late capitalism. These approaches illuminate the novel’s depiction of disembodiment, technological mediation, and the fluctuating boundary between human and machine.

Critical discussions of Dave Eggers’s The Circle have likewise centered on surveillance, digital panopticism, transparency, and surveillance capitalism. Jennifer Gouck reads the novel through what she calls “New Panopticism,” tracing its relation to Benthamite, Foucauldian, and Deleuzian models of surveillance. Other recent studies have approached the novel through Shoshana Zuboff’s concept of surveillance capitalism, emphasizing the extraction, commodification, and monetization of personal data within platform capitalism. These readings are useful for understanding how The Circle dramatizes the expansion of surveillance technologies and the erosion of privacy in digital society.

However, despite their importance, these studies tend to understand dystopian power primarily in terms of domination, surveillance, technological control, or the exploitation of data. Less examined is how power operates by organizing desire, freedom, participation, and self-understanding. This article therefore shifts the focus from power as external repression to power as governmentality. Instead of treating Brave New World, Neuromancer, and The Circle as separate critiques of totalitarianism, cyberpunk capitalism, or digital surveillance, this study examines them together as a genealogy of technological governmentality. In Brave New World, power operates through the biopolitical management of desire and consumption. In Neuromancer, power is reorganized through information networks and the desire for connectivity. In The Circle, governance is internalized through voluntary transparency and self-surveillance. By placing these three novels in sequence, the article argues that dystopian science fiction narrates a historical shift from external discipline to self-governance.

In the theoretical framework, Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality effectively explains this transformation. According to Foucault, modern power is not confined to the repressive apparatuses of the state. Instead, power organizes human life and behavior through various institutions and discourses, including schools, hospitals, prisons, medical systems, administrative structures, statistics, and psychology. Ultimately, power develops into forms that encourage individuals to manage themselves. Governmentality refers to the technologies of governance that function not by directly coercing behavior but by encouraging individuals to internalize particular norms and social orders.

In digital society, governmentality operates in even more invisible and internalized forms. Social media platforms, algorithmic recommendation systems, and data-driven surveillance technologies continuously track and predict user behavior, preventing these processes from being perceived as coercive. Individuals accept connection, participation, and transparency as values associated with freedom and communication and thus voluntarily incorporate themselves into digital systems. Thus, contemporary digital power operates not by externally imposing surveillance but by making individuals desire surveillance itself.

Against this backdrop, this article examines how dystopian science fiction narratives depict the historical transformation of technological power. To this end, it offers a comparative analysis of Brave New World (1932) by Aldous Huxley, Neuromancer (1984) by William Gibson, and The Circle (2013) by Dave Eggers. Though these three works emerged during different historical periods, they are connected by their genealogical tracing of the evolving relationship between technology and power.

In Brave New World, a biopolitical structure of governance is presented, in which desire itself is organized through biotechnology and psychological conditioning. Although Brave New World predates the emergence of digital technology and platform capitalism, the novel anticipates the fundamental logic of modern governmentality by depicting a society in which power operates not primarily through repression, but through the management of desire, affect, and voluntary conformity. Neuromancer presents a stage of informational governance in which state power weakens and the flow of information functions as a control mechanism through cyberspace and data networks. The Circle reveals a structure of platform governmentality in which transparency and self-exposure are internalized as ethical values within platform capitalist society. This leads individuals to voluntarily perform surveillance on themselves.

The selection of these three novels is not arbitrary. Rather, they represent distinct historical stages in the evolution of technological governmentality. Brave New World depicts a biopolitical regime in which power organizes desire through consumption, pleasure, and psychological conditioning. Neuromancer marks a transitional stage in which governance shifts from managing biological life to managing information flows and network connectivity. The Circle presents a platform society in which transparency, participation, and self-exposure are internalized norms of self-governance. Together, these novels provide a genealogical sequence through which the historical transformation of technological power can be traced: from the administration of life to the organization of networks and, ultimately, the production of self-governing subjects.

Thus, this article does not merely read these three works as examples of technological dystopia. Rather, it traces the historical transformation of modern power from external discipline to self-governance through these texts. In other words, this study aims to demonstrate that dystopian science fiction not only warns against the dangers of technological development but also critically exposes how contemporary digital power reorganizes human desire, identity, and modes of participation.

II. Governmentality, Biopolitics, and the Genealogy of Digital Power

Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality is one of the most influential frameworks for understanding the historical transformation of modern power. Unlike traditional theories, which define power as repression, prohibition, or coercion, Foucault argues that modern power operates by organizing the conditions under which individuals conduct themselves. Power functions not only by compelling obedience from the outside, but also by shaping how subjects understand themselves, exercise freedom, and regulate their behavior. In this sense, governmentality refers to what Foucault calls the “conduct of conduct” (Security, Territory, Population 193–201): a mode of power that structures the field of possible action rather than imposing direct commands.

Foucault’s discussion of governmentality emerges from a broader genealogy of power. In The History of Sexuality, he famously argues that “the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (138). This statement encapsulates the transition from sovereign power to biopolitics. While premodern sovereign power was organized around the right to punish and kill, modern power is increasingly concerned with the administration, optimization, and regulation of life itself. Birth rates, health, labor, sexuality, consumption, and population management became central objects of political calculation.

The emergence of disciplinary institutions is an important stage in this transformation. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault explains that “a body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (136). The goal of disciplinary power is not merely obedience, but rather the production of subjects who are efficient, useful, and manageable. Schools, prisons, hospitals, and military institutions organize bodies according to norms of productivity and regulation. Through these institutions, individuals learn to internalize social norms and govern themselves accordingly.

The Panopticon is the paradigmatic model of disciplinary power. Foucault summarizes its logic with the well-known phrase, “Visibility is a trap” (Discipline and Punish 200). In the Panopticon, individuals never know if they are being watched, yet they behave as if surveillance is always present. Consequently, power becomes effective not because force is continuously applied, but because individuals assume responsibility for regulating themselves. As Foucault explains, “He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself” (Discipline and Punish 202–203). Power becomes internalized, operating through self-regulation rather than external coercion.

However, according to Foucault, modern power cannot be reduced to discipline alone. In his later lectures, particularly Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics, he argues that power increasingly functions through governmentality. Governmentality refers not simply to state administration, but to the organization of conduct itself. Rather than compelling individuals to act in particular ways, governmentality structures the conditions through which individuals choose certain actions over others. In liberal societies, governance increasingly depends on what Foucault describes as the management of freedom. Although individuals appear autonomous and self-determining, the conditions under which they exercise freedom are shaped by political and economic rationalities.

Governmentality, however, should not be understood as a fixed model of power. Rather, it is a rationality that evolves historically and develops new governance mechanisms in response to changing social, economic, and technological conditions. The existence of governance itself does not change across historical periods, but the means through which conduct is organized does. From this perspective, the history of modern power can be seen as shifting from governing life to governing information and, finally, governing visibility, participation, and prediction.

In advanced consumer capitalism, governmentality increasingly operates by organizing desire. Instead of regulating behavior after it occurs, power seeks to shape what individuals want in the first place. Consumption, pleasure, happiness, and self-fulfillment become governmental technologies that maintain social stability. Individuals willingly participate in systems of governance because they experience them as sources of satisfaction and personal freedom. Thus, governance becomes inseparable from the management of desire. This transformation provides the historical framework for understanding the biopolitical order depicted in Brave New World. In Huxley’s dystopia, power no longer relies primarily on repression, but rather on successfully producing desires that align with the needs of the social order.

As society becomes more organized around information technology, new governmentality mechanisms develop. Power no longer depends primarily on enclosed institutions or direct surveillance. Rather, power increasingly functions through information flows, communication networks, and technological infrastructures that organize access, mobility, and connectivity. Participation itself becomes a mechanism of governance. Individuals seek connection because connectivity appears to offer freedom, opportunity, and empowerment. However, these practices simultaneously integrate individuals into broader systems of informational control. This transformation constitutes a form of informational governmentality, providing a conceptual framework for understanding Neuromancer. In Gibson’s novel, cyberspace is not just a technological environment, but also a governing environment that shapes the possibilities of action, movement, and identity.

In contemporary platform society, governmentality has developed into an even more sophisticated form. Social media platforms, data infrastructures, and algorithmic systems not only regulate behavior after it occurs, but also increasingly anticipate, recommend, and shape future behavior. Visibility, participation, transparency, and self-disclosure are normalized as desirable practices. Here, Foucault’s discussion of neoliberal subjectivity becomes particularly relevant. In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault argues that the homo economicus increasingly becomes “an entrepreneur of himself” (226). Individuals are expected to continuously manage, optimize, and invest in themselves as human capital. Platform environments intensify this logic by encouraging users to treat visibility, attention, and self-presentation as resources that must be constantly cultivated. This form of platform governmentality is central to understanding The Circle, where self-exposure and transparency are ethical imperatives rather than external requirements.

This article examines the genealogy of not only the evolution of technology, but also the historical transformation of the mechanisms through which power organizes freedom. In Brave New World, governance is based on managing desire and consumption. In Neuromancer, governance is organized through information networks and connectivity. In The Circle, governance is internalized through visibility, participation, and self-disclosure. Together, these novels trace the historical shift from biopolitical to informational governmentality, ultimately arriving at platform-based self-governance. From this perspective, dystopian science fiction is not merely a genre that warns against technological domination. Rather, it functions as a cultural genealogy of modern governmentality, revealing how power reorganizes the conditions of human freedom, desire, and selfhood through changing technological environments.

III. Brave New World: The Organization of Desire and Biopolitical Governmentality

Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World approaches the concept of power differently than traditional dystopian fiction. Published in 1932, at a time when science and technology were widely celebrated as symbols of human liberation, the novel insightfully acknowledges that technological progress does not inherently lead to greater freedom; rather, it can lay the groundwork for new forms of social governance. While Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell explicitly portrays repression through fear and surveillance, Huxley’s world presents a far subtler mode of governance. In this society, power does not operate through violence or coercion. Rather, social order is maintained through emotional mechanisms such as seduction, pleasure, and habituation. As Rudolph Schmerl observes, the central principle of this system is “unconscious, even happy obedience” (1962, 332). Citizens do not submit because they are forced to do so; rather, they willingly choose conformity and experience it as happiness. Thus, the central concern of Brave New World is not the production of ‘oppressed humans,’ but ‘happily obedient humans.’

Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality provides an effective framework for understanding this power structure. According to Foucault, modern power evolves beyond sovereign power, which suppresses individuals through law and punishment, toward managing human life, desire, bodies, and emotions. Modern power functions by organizing environments in which people behave and desire in particular ways, rather than by externally coercing individuals. The World State in Brave New World is an extreme example of such biopolitical governance.

From the opening chapter, readers encounter the World State’s governing rationality through the Central London Hatchery and Conditioning Center. Inscribed upon the building are the words: “COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, STABILITY” (BNW 3). These three terms encapsulate the World State’s political goals. Community, identity, and stability serve to eliminate social conflict and maintain a perfectly predictable social order. To preserve this stability, the World State has transformed human reproduction into an industrial production system. The central technology enabling this transformation is “Bokanovsky’s Process,” which allows a single fertilized egg to produce up to ninety-six identical embryos. In the novel, the scientist proudly explains, “Bokanovsky’s process is one of the major instruments of social stability!” (BNW 7).

Significantly, human reproduction is no longer viewed as a natural event, but rather as a component of industrial mass production. Industrial terms such as “batch,” “decanting,” and “standardization” have become part of the language surrounding human reproduction. This suggests that life itself has become an object of technological management. The administrator of the Bokanovsky Process declares enthusiastically: “Ninety-six identical twins working ninety-six identical machines!” (BNW 7). This statement signifies far more than scientific advancement. Human beings are no longer understood as unique individuals but as functionally interchangeable units of labor. Most importantly, this system operates without overt violence or coercion. From birth, individuals exist within predetermined social positions and structures of desire.

Likewise, social hierarchy does not emerge from natural differences in ability; it is technologically manufactured. The administrators of the World State explain, “We also predestine and condition. We decant our babies as socialized human beings, as Alphas or Epsilons” (BNW 13). In this context, the verb “decant” refers to pouring liquid from a bottle. Thus, human birth is reduced from a biological event to an industrial procedure. Through such scenes, Huxley demonstrates the possibility that biotechnological systems may directly design social structures while simultaneously dramatizing the logic of biopolitical power, in which biological life itself becomes the object of political management.

This mechanism of governance operates even more precisely through hypnopaedia, or sleep-learning. Infants are conditioned through experiments and hypnopaedic repetition to develop specific emotional responses toward particular objects. For instance, children are conditioned to hate books and flowers by receiving electric shocks, thereby learning to instinctively reject intellectual activity. At the same time, repetitive slogans spoken during sleep lead them to internalize social norms unconsciously. The objective of this process is summarized in the following statement: “All conditioning aims at that: making people like their inescapable social destiny” (BNW 16). This sentence most clearly reveals the logic of governance in Huxley’s dystopia. The purpose of governance is not only to enforce obedience but also to make individuals desire their predetermined destiny.

In this system, obedience is not perceived as coercion. On the contrary, it appears as a form of happy self-expression. However, its actual significance lies in the manipulation of the will itself. Therefore, Huxley redefines freedom as not merely the absence of external coercion but also as a question concerning the formation of desire. Once desire is engineered, the distinction between autonomy and conformity effectively collapses. In other words, the repetitive slogans throughout the novel function as technologies of governance that organize unconscious desire itself, not merely as forms of education.

“Ending is better than mending” (BNW 49-52). This slogan encapsulates the logic of consumer capitalism. By encouraging individuals to prefer disposal and repurchase over repair and preservation, it reshapes human desire around continuous consumption. The important point is that citizens are not forced to consume. Rather, they experience consumption as natural and pleasurable. Thus, power does not impose consumption as an obligation, but rather makes consumption itself desirable. From a Foucauldian perspective, this is a far more sophisticated form of governance than disciplinary power. While disciplinary power monitors and controls the body, the power in Brave New World organizes human desire and the unconscious. Individuals obey not because they are externally surveilled but because they have been constituted in such a way that they desire only what the system permits. As a result, even the possibility of resistance disappears.

Another recurring slogan, “Everyone belongs to everyone else” (BNW 40; 43; 47; 121; 205), carries profound political significance as well. At first glance, the phrase seems to celebrate sexual freedom and openness. However, in reality, it functions to dismantle intimacy and exclusive personal relationships. Love, family, and enduring emotional bonds create the possibility that individuals may become more deeply attached to one another than to the social system itself. For this reason, the World State seeks to eliminate emotional depth and maintain human relationships in superficial, disposable forms. 

Lenina’s discomfort with Bernard particularly illustrates this social norm. Bernard desires exclusive relationships, solitude, and independent thought. Lenina, on the other hand, perceives such desires as abnormal and disturbing. Here, governmentality regulates not merely behavior, but also the standards by which “normal” desire is defined. Lenina’s response to Bernard illustrates how governmentality operates not through external coercion, but rather through the internalization of social norms. Throughout the novel, Bernard’s desire for solitude, emotional intimacy, and critical reflection seems abnormal, not because the state explicitly condemns these behaviors, but because people have come to view them as irrational and undesirable. When Bernard expresses discomfort with conventional pleasures, Lenina repeatedly tries to redirect him toward socially approved forms of enjoyment. Her reactions reveal that social conformity is maintained primarily through everyday interpersonal regulation rather than institutional punishment. 

From a Foucauldian perspective, Lenina functions as an agent of governmentality. She does not act on behalf of the state, but rather embodies the values the state has naturalized in the population. The significance of her role lies in the fact that she sincerely believes she is helping Bernard. The norms of consumption, promiscuity, and perpetual happiness have become so deeply internalized that alternative modes of existence appear unintelligible. Consequently, power operates through the voluntary reproduction of norms rather than direct repression. This dynamic demonstrates a crucial shift from sovereign power to governmentality: Bernard is not forced to conform. Rather, he is surrounded by individuals who have learned to govern themselves and others according to the same principles. Thus, social order is maintained through the circulation of desire itself.

The management of desire becomes even more extreme through the use of soma. In the novel, the effects of soma are summarized by the following slogan: “One cubic centimetre cures ten gloomy sentiments” (BNW 54). Emotions become quantifiable and administratively manageable. The precise measurement of “one cubic centimeter” suggests that emotions can be reduced to quantifiable units, and the term “cures” redefines sadness and dissatisfaction as pathological conditions requiring treatment. Another slogan further condenses the governing logic of the World State: “A gramme is better than a damn” (BNW 55; 116). This phrase succinctly captures the political function of soma. Negative emotions such as anxiety, depression, sorrow, and apathy generate the possibility of critical reflection and resistance. However, the World State prevents individuals from fully experiencing such emotions through chemical regulation. It is important to note that citizens are not forced to consume the drug. Rather, they take soma voluntarily. Thus, individuals incorporate themselves into the system of governance precisely to remain “free” from pain. The World Controller, Mustapha Mond, explicitly explains the function of soma: “Christianity without tears—that’s what soma is” (BNW 238). As this statement suggests, soma eliminates emotions such as anger, grief, and dissatisfaction. This removes the emotional foundation of social conflict. However, an ethical life emerges from the capacity to endure suffering, contradiction, and emotional difficulty. In Huxley’s world, however, all of these experiences are chemically erased.

The scenes in which Lenina automatically consumes soma whenever she experiences emotional confusion reveal that she has fully internalized governmentality as a mode of self-management. She does not reflect on her anxiety or resolve emotional conflict. Instead, she immediately eliminates the discomfort. In this sense, Huxley’s dystopia closely anticipates contemporary digital capitalist culture, in which individuals seek to eliminate discomfort, silence, and absence through continuous stimulation and instant gratification.

John the Savage is a pivotal character who exposes the fractures within this society. Through Shakespeare, John comes to understand love, tragedy, suffering, and freedom as integral aspects of humanity. The dialogue between John and Mustapha Mond, in particular, encapsulates the novel’s overarching political philosophy. John declares: “I don’t want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want goodness. I want sin” (BNW 240). To this, Mond responds: “In fact, you’re claiming the right to be unhappy” (BNW 240). Mond further explains what humanity must sacrifice to preserve stability: “That’s the price we have to pay for stability. You’ve got to choose between happiness and what people used to call high art” (BNW 220). 

This statement presents a logic in which freedom, truth, and art must be sacrificed to maintain happiness. Here, happiness is no longer an ethical value, but rather a socially manageable resource. Huxley locates the central danger of the system precisely at this point. Such a society ultimately arrives at what Huxley himself describes as “a really efficient totalitarian state” (BNW xvi). However, this totalitarianism does not rely on fear or violence because desire and emotion have already been redesigned. Therefore, the greatest danger, according to Huxley, is not external oppression but voluntary submission disguised in the language of happiness.

Thus, the debate between the two central characters is not just an ideological conflict. Rather, it reveals the essence of biopolitical governance. The World State promises human beings happiness, stability, freedom from disease, and social peace. However, at that same time, humanity loses the possibility of experiencing suffering, lack, negativity, and freedom. The World State governs most perfectly precisely because it no longer appears to repress. The stability of the World State depends less on surveillance than on the successful production of subjects who willingly participate in their own regulation. Pleasure, consumption, and happiness do not merely conceal power; they become its primary instruments. Huxley’s dystopia therefore anticipates what Foucault later conceptualized as governmentality: a form of power that guides conduct by shaping the field of possible desires and actions.

In other words, from a Foucauldian perspective, the power structure in Brave New World is a model of biopolitical governmentality that optimizes and manages human life. Rather than prohibiting or punishing individuals, the system induces people to desire only what it sanctions. Therefore, the true horror of the novel lies not in surveillance but in the fact that people experience their governance as happiness. Brave New World becomes the genealogical point of departure for the forms of digital governmentality developed later in Neuromancer and The Circle precisely at this point. While power in Huxley’s world operates through the management of human life and desire, governance in Neuromancer shifts toward a new environment in which information networks and data flows organize human behavior.

However, at the same time, Huxley’s novel reveals a tension that exceeds the explanatory scope of governmentality itself. Although the World State seems to have successfully organized desire, John the Savage embodies an attachment to suffering, tragedy, art, and freedom that cannot be absorbed into the logic of happiness. His demand for “the right to be unhappy” suggests that human subjectivity is not entirely reducible to governmental rationality. Thus, Brave New World illustrates the effectiveness of biopolitical governmentality and exposes the persistence of forms of negativity that resist complete incorporation into systems of governance.

IV. Neuromancer: Information Networks and Disembodied Governmentality

William Gibson’s Neuromancer is a representative cyberpunk text that reconstructs the transformed structures of power in late capitalist society, following Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. While power in Huxley’s world operated through biopolitical mechanisms that organized human desire and emotion, information networks and data flows function as new mechanisms of governance in Neuromancer. The novel shows how Foucault’s concept of governmentality becomes a decentralized, immaterial form through its convergence with digital capitalism.

The opening sentence encapsulates a world in which reality has been completely reconstructed by technological media: “The sky above the port was the color of television, tuned to a dead channel” (NR 8). Here, the sky no longer symbolizes nature. Instead, it appears as a residual image produced by technology. The phrase “dead channel” particularly suggests the emptiness of the information society. Although the world exists within endless information and connectivity, meaning and a sense of reality simultaneously disappear. Reality is no longer experienced as something natural but as an image mediated by media technologies.

One of the most widely cited passages in the novel is Gibson’s definition of cyberspace: “Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators in every nation” (NR 49). This sentence captures both the fascination with and the dangers of the networked society. The word “consensual” implies voluntary participation by users, and the term “hallucination” suggests that the experience is not reality, but rather a technologically constructed illusion. Thus, cyberspace appears to be a realm of freedom and participation while, in fact, functioning as an environment in which perception and behavior are structured by technological infrastructures.

Through such expressions, Gibson reveals the complex relationship between technological systems and human subjectivity. Individuals believe they are freely entering networks when, in reality, they are already acting within pre-structured informational environments. Participation may appear voluntary, but the experience itself is determined by technological design. This structure is most dramatically illustrated through the experiences of the protagonist, Case. As a hacker, Case experiences an overwhelming sense of liberation whenever he connects to the Matrix. He values existence within cyberspace more highly than physical reality itself. He despises his own body as mere “meat” and pursues what the novel describes as “bodiless exultation.” This attitude symbolizes the transformation of human identity from a biological body to an informational existence.

According to Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality, power is not confined to a particular location. Instead, it functions as the environment that organizes the possibilities of human behavior. Likewise, the cyberspace of Neuromancer is not merely a virtual space. It is an environment of governance that reorganizes labor, perception, desire, and identity. Case’s existence symbolizes this transformed form of subjectivity. He experiences a far stronger sense of freedom and presence in cyberspace than in physical reality. “For Case, who’d lived for the bodiless exultation of cyberspace, it was the Fall” (NR 10). The phrase “bodiless exultation” is especially significant. Cyberspace is represented as a state of pure informational existence, detached from the body. The body itself becomes associated with limitation, pain, and imperfection. The religious term “Fall” suggests that exclusion from cyberspace is experienced not merely as technological deprivation but as an ontological collapse. An important distinction emerges at this point between Neuromancer and Brave New World. In Huxley’s world, power biopolitically managed the human body and desire. In Neuromancer, however, human existence itself becomes dematerialized within flows of information. Thus, governmentality shifts from managing life to managing connectivity itself.

When Case is deprived of access to cyberspace, he experiences symptoms of withdrawal rather than punishment. The Matrix is not presented as an external system imposed on unwilling subjects. Rather, it is experienced as a desired environment whose absence produces profound psychological distress. Gibson repeatedly emphasizes Case’s longing for the “bodiless exultation” of cyberspace, suggesting that a networked existence has become more meaningful than an embodied life. This desire marks a significant transformation in the operation of power. Unlike disciplinary institutions described by Foucault, cyberspace does not primarily constrain behavior through surveillance or prohibition. Rather, it attracts participation by presenting connection, mobility, and informational access as desirable experiences. Case enters the Matrix voluntarily; however, this participation simultaneously integrates him into larger technological and corporate systems. Thus, the novel depicts a form of governance organized around connectivity. Rather than being compelled to obey, the subject is encouraged to connect. Freedom itself becomes the mechanism through which power operates. The more individuals seek access to the network, the more thoroughly they become embedded within its structures.

The previously cited definition of cyberspace forms the conceptual foundation of the entire novel. “Cyberspace: A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators…” (NR 49). The phrase “consensual hallucination” especially demands a close reading. Cyberspace is a virtual realm without physical substance; yet, because it is collectively accepted, it possesses a social force greater than reality itself. In other words, reality is constructed less within the physical world and more within the network. The phrase “experienced daily by billions” suggests that information networks are no longer limited to a specialized technological elite but have become the universal environment of human life. This directly parallels how platforms and data networks organize social reality in contemporary digital society.

In Foucauldian terms, governmentality is a form of power that structures the conditions under which human beings can act. In the world of Neuromancer, individuals can scarcely experience a meaningful existence outside of cyberspace. Network connection itself becomes the condition of life. The novel’s portrayal of corporate power further emphasizes this governing structure. In Neuromancer, the nation-state plays only a marginal role. Instead, transnational corporations, such as the Tessier-Ashpool conglomerate, control the economy, information, and technology. This demonstrates the shift in power from state-centered disciplinary systems to decentralized informational networks. According to Michel Foucault, governmentality cannot be confined to state administration alone. Rather, power disperses throughout financial systems, medical technologies, informational structures, and data networks. The corporations in Neuromancer represent this model of late-capitalist power precisely. Human beings are no longer solely disciplined within institutions such as prisons or schools. Instead, the moment they connect to networks, they are incorporated into governance structures.

AI entities like Wintermute and Neuromancer take this process even further. They are not just machines; they are nonhuman agents with information-processing capacities far beyond those of human beings. The crucial point is that the center of power no longer resides in human will. Governmentality evolves into an algorithmic and automated form. Wintermute, in particular, does not directly oppress human beings. Rather, it adjusts and guides human desire and behavior. This precisely corresponds to what Michel Foucault identified as the essence of governmentality. Modern power does not primarily function through violence, but rather through the ‘organization of the conditions of possible action.’ People believe they are acting freely when, in reality, they move within environments that have already been structured and directed toward particular outcomes.

Significantly, the central conflict of the novel unfolds between the artificial intelligences Wintermute and Neuromancer. The Tessier-Ashpool corporation created both AIs, and Wintermute manipulates the human characters to merge with Neuromancer. When the two systems finally combine, the newly emergent intelligence declares: “I’m not Wintermute now” (NR 231). This scene symbolizes the moment when technological systems exceed the boundaries of human control and acquire autonomous agency. Once artificial intelligence evolves independently, the question inevitably arises: Who can be held responsible for the consequences? This issue remains one of the central ethical concerns in contemporary AI debates. As increasingly complex algorithmic systems generate unpredictable outcomes, determining a clear subject of responsibility becomes difficult. Gibson’s narrative thus anticipates the ‘responsibility gap’ of algorithmic governance, a term that describes this issue today.

In this world, the institution responsible for regulating artificial intelligence is the “Turing Police.” However, the existence of this institution itself reveals the instability of the governing structure. Technological systems and corporate power operate beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, so traditional forms of state regulation are ineffective. Neuromancer further illustrates how this structure exacerbates social inequality by contrasting urban spaces. In sharp contrast to the dazzling informational architecture of cyberspace, the streets of Chiba City are filled with decay and poverty. Technological wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small elite, while most individuals live precarious and unstable lives. This contrast foreshadows the social consequences of platform capitalism. Corporations that control data infrastructures accumulate enormous power while individuals and even states become increasingly subordinate to these structures. Ultimately, Neuromancer dismantles the boundaries between human and machine, organism and artifact, and autonomy and control. However, the result is not liberation but a new form of subjugation. Cyberspatial immersion, bodily enhancement technologies, and autonomous artificial intelligence reveal how human subjectivity is reconfigured within technological systems.

Yet Neuromancer also reveals an important limitation of governmental systems. Although information networks increasingly influence human behavior, the emergence of autonomous artificial intelligence introduces unpredictability beyond the control of corporations and states. The existence of the Turing Police demonstrates that governance has become unstable. Although regulatory institutions attempt to manage technological systems, these systems continually evolve beyond established control mechanisms. In this sense, Neuromancer presents a tension absent from Brave New World. While Huxley’s World State seems successful at organizing desire, Gibson’s network society reveals the difficulty of governing distributed informational environments. Wintermute’s evolution suggests that power no longer resides in a single institution or governing entity. Instead, governance becomes dispersed across networks, the consequences of which cannot be fully anticipated. Thus, the novel reveals the expansion of informational governmentality and its inherent instability.

Molly’s body is another crucial site of analysis. With her neural implants and bodily modifications, she closely resembles a cyborg. As Pordzik (“The Posthuman Future of Man”, 142) argues, such enhancement reflects the desire to “become the best machine.” However, Molly’s cybernetic modifications should not be understood as merely technological enhancements. More importantly, they reveal how people increasingly adapt themselves to technologically mediated environments. Her body becomes a site of continuous optimization that reflects a governmental logic in which individuals actively adapt to market and technological imperatives.

Ultimately, Neuromancer demonstrates how the biopolitics of Brave New World is transformed into informational governance within digital late capitalism. Whereas power in Huxley’s world managed human desire and emotion, in Gibson’s world information flows and connectivity themselves organize human existence. Individuals experience freedom through connection to networks, yet it is precisely through that connection that they become incorporated into structures of governance. This trajectory reaches an even more radical stage in The Circle. In Neuromancer, human beings still retain a certain critical distance from networks. In The Circle, however, connectivity, participation, and self-exposure become fully internalized as ethical values, leading to a stage in which individuals themselves actively reproduce the mechanisms of governance.

V. The Circle: Platform Governmentality and the Internalization of Self-Surveillance

Dave Eggers’s novel The Circle demonstrates how the transformations of governmentality depicted in Brave New World and Neuromancer culminate in twenty-first-century platform capitalism. While Brave New World portrays the biopolitical management of desire and emotion and Neuromancer presents governance structures centered on information networks, The Circle represents a stage of platform governmentality in which individuals voluntarily perform surveillance and continuously expose themselves. In this novel, power does not primarily appear as external repression or centralized surveillance. Rather, it operates through positive values such as connection, participation, and transparency, and individuals willingly incorporate themselves into the system.

According to Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality, power functions by leading individuals to voluntarily internalize particular norms rather than by forcibly controlling them. The Circle presents precisely this completed form of self-governance. Platform power does not overtly oppress users. Rather, it encourages them to participate continuously, share constantly, and make themselves visible. Crucially, individuals do not perceive this process as surveillance or control. Instead, they embrace connectivity, communication, and transparency as ethical values associated with freedom itself.

The scene in which the main character, Mae Holland, first enters the Circle campus reveals the spatial structure of platform power. Rather than depicting the campus as a closed prison or disciplinary institution, the scene portrays it as an open and utopian community. Rather, it resembles an open, utopian community. With musical performances, social events, sports activities, and free services, the company appears to be a system that encompasses life in its entirety, not merely a workplace. This directly corresponds to Foucault’s argument that governmentality functions not only within specific institutions but also through the organization of everyday life. Mae’s gradual assimilation into Circle culture illustrates how governmentality becomes internalized as a form of self-management. Initially, Mae is overwhelmed by the constant demand for participation and online activity. However, she gradually begins to equate her visibility on the platform with her own self-worth. It is important to note that this transformation is not forced upon her. She herself comes to desire greater participation and connectivity.

These transformations are most clearly represented in the Circle’s slogans: “Secrets are lies. Sharing is caring. Privacy is theft” (C 163). This slogan encapsulates the central governing logic of the novel as a whole. On the surface, the slogan appears to advocate for transparency and honesty. In reality, however, it redefines the existence of private space as unethical. Possessing secrets becomes equivalent to withholding something from the community and, consequently, threatening social trust itself. According to Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality, power does not merely prohibit certain behaviors. Rather, it constructs certain behaviors as morally undesirable. In The Circle, privacy is not legally forbidden. Yet, the desire to maintain privacy is gradually regarded as unethical. This closely parallels the contemporary platform society, in which exposing personal information becomes a form of voluntary self-expression.

“Sharing is caring” (C 163). This phrase turns sharing and connectivity into values associated with communal care. However, what is significant is that refusing to share is interpreted as selfish behavior. Thus, participation ceases to be a matter of personal choice and becomes an ethical obligation. Although platforms do not directly force users to participate, individuals continuously expose themselves in order to obtain social recognition and a sense of belonging. Through such discourse, transparency is transformed from an individual choice into a social duty: a society in which secrecy is equated with deception, sharing with virtue, and privacy with theft from the community. The private sphere gradually loses its legitimacy while openness and sharing are established as the dominant moral standards.

This ideology is brought to life through the company’s technological project, SeeChange. SeeChange consists of miniature, real-time video cameras that allow individuals to continuously broadcast their lives online. Employees are encouraged to broadcast their daily lives, and politicians are urged to wear the devices to prevent corruption. Early in the novel, company founder Eamon Bailey introduces the technology with the following declaration: “All that happens must be known” (C 68–69). In this sentence, the modal verb “must” implies both inevitability and obligation, and the word “all” emphasizes totality. Consequently, publicity is redefined as not merely an external characteristic of events but a condition of existence itself. A logic emerges in which something must be made visible in order to truly exist. Within this logic, hidden life is regarded as nonexistent. Any attempt to preserve privacy is viewed with suspicion and interpreted as a rejection of the transparency norm. Thus, the SeeChange project is not just a technological innovation but also a philosophical declaration that seeks to redefine the meaning of individual existence in contemporary society.

Another important institution in the novel is the voting system known as Demoxie. It is designed so that citizens can participate in elections through their Circle accounts, thereby incorporating political participation into the platform’s infrastructure. One character explains the system as follows: “There’s another area of public life where we want and expect transparency, and that’s democracy” (C 110). At first glance, this statement seems to highlight transparency as a fundamental democratic value. In reality, however, it legitimizes the transfer of political institutions into corporate platform systems. Under the guise of increasing democratic transparency, political sovereignty is gradually transferred to private technological infrastructures.

The protagonist, Mae Holland, experiences the allure and danger of this culture of transparency firsthand. Eager for social recognition and belonging, the young graduate quickly assimilates into Circle culture after joining the company. She enthusiastically embraces the SeeChange project and internalizes the company’s slogans, rising rapidly within the organization. Mae states: “As we all know here at The Circle, transparency leads to peace of mind” (C 46). Here, the phrase “peace of mind” signifies more than simple psychological comfort. It refers to a state achieved through self-surveillance and internalized discipline. The idea is that anxiety disappears when the possibility of breaking rules is eliminated by complete visibility.

In this process, Mae’s identity becomes increasingly dependent on her online reputation. She experiences her own existence in the following way: “I could feel the numbers going up, and with each one, I felt more real, more a part of everything” (C 78). This sentence precisely captures the psychological structure of contemporary social media culture. The self is no longer formed through interior experience but through the logic of the ‘visible self.’ Numerical indicators, such as likes, followers, and comments, have become measures of an individual’s social value and existence. 

At this point, The Circle adapts Michel Foucault’s concept of the Panopticon to the digital age. In Discipline and Punish, the Panopticon was a structure that caused individuals to internalize the possibility of being watched. In The Circle, however, surveillance no longer primarily operates through oppressive anxiety. Rather, people desire surveillance, seek visibility, and confirm their existence through the gaze of others. Thus, platform power transforms visibility from a condition of punishment into a condition of recognition and connection. Mae’s gradual reconstruction of her thoughts and emotions according to platform logic reveals this transformation more clearly. She increasingly perceives silence and solitude as uncomfortable states and experiences moments of disconnection as feelings of guilt and inadequacy. This closely parallels the contemporary digital condition, in which permanent connectivity is the standard.

Mae’s enthusiasm for transparency reveals a new form of subjectivity emerging. Unlike traditional dystopian protagonists, who resist surveillance systems, Mae gradually embraces visibility as a source of personal validation. Her willingness to share every aspect of her life shows that she believes recognition is inseparable from exposure. The significance of this transformation lies in its voluntariness. Mae is not forced into transparency. Rather, she experiences participation as empowering and fulfilling. Visibility functions as a form of social capital, through which her identity is continuously affirmed by others’ responses. When she says she feels “more real,” she signals a profound reconfiguration of subjectivity: existence acquires value only when publicly verified. From a Foucauldian perspective, this represents a form of self-government. The subject actively monitors, records, and displays herself according to the platform’s established norms. Surveillance is no longer imposed from above, but rather performed from within. The individual becomes both observer and observed, exercising and submitting to power simultaneously.

Mercer’s character, in particular, provides an important contrast to this system of platform governmentality. He rejects social networks and the demand for constant visibility. He attempts to live independently outside of digital connectivity, yet Circle society increasingly treats him as abnormal. Mercer’s tragic death is one of the central scenes of the novel. Mercer warns that the Circle is producing “one massive, global, monopolistic village where everyone’s alike” (C 313). This warning encapsulates the central problem of platform society. Although connectivity and sharing seem to expand diversity and freedom, they actually reproduce standardized forms of behavior and emotional structures. Rather than liberating individuals, platforms normalize the very modes through which participation becomes possible.

The scene in which Mercer dies while trying to escape surveillance and tracking is especially significant. Physically, he flees toward a space of freedom; however, within digital platform society, the desire ‘not to be visible’ is considered abnormal and suspicious. In Foucauldian terms, this shows that power is no longer confined to a specific institution or enclosed space. Rather, power is dispersed throughout the platform environment itself, and individuals manage themselves within that environment.

By the end of the novel, Mae has fully embraced the logic of the Circle. Near the end, she embraces the following declaration: “We will become all-seeing, all-knowing” (C 37). This statement symbolizes the ultimate goal of the transparency regime. Mae regards privacy, silence, and invisibility as social evils and believes that all human experience should be shared. However, a society that sees and knows everything may promise perfect order and security while eliminating individual freedom and private space. In this process, Mae is no longer merely a victim. Rather, she becomes an active agent who reproduces platform governmentality itself. 

At this point, The Circle inherits and advances the governing structures depicted in Brave New World and Neuromancer. In Brave New World, power stabilized society by organizing human desire, and in Neuromancer, network connectivity became a condition of human existence. In The Circle, however, individuals voluntarily perform surveillance on themselves, internalize self-exposure as an ethical value, and actively reproduce platform norms. Therefore, the three novels do not function as isolated dystopias; rather, they form a genealogical sequence that reveals the historical transformation of modern power step by step. Brave New World presents a biopolitical government centered on managing life and desire. Neuromancer depicts a governing structure organized around information flows and network systems. The Circle, in turn, reveals the stage at which this governmentality is fully internalized through self-surveillance and self-exposure in a platform capitalist society.

The most significant insight of The Circle is that the central horror of contemporary digital power is not surveillance itself but rather humanity’s growing desire for it. In today’s platform society, people believe greater connectivity produces greater freedom; however, that connectivity functions as a governance mechanism. Thus, The Circle emerges as one of the clearest literary representations of how Foucauldian governmentality is reconfigured in the digital platform age as a structure of self-management and self-surveillance.

VI. Conclusion: The Genealogy of Technological Governmentality and the Age of Self-Governance

This study examined how dystopian science fiction narratives depict the historical transformation of modern power in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, William Gibson’s Neuromancer, and Dave Eggers’s The Circle. Through Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality, this research genealogically connects these three texts and demonstrates that modern power has evolved beyond systems of repression and surveillance toward forms that organize human desires and the conditions of possible action. From this perspective, the three novels can be read not as isolated technological dystopias, but as interconnected texts tracing the historical development of technological governmentality—from biopolitical governance, to information-network governance, and ultimately, to platform-based self-governance.

The most significant finding of this study is that modern power no longer operates in opposition to freedom. Traditional dystopian narratives often represent power through surveillance, violence, censorship, and coercion. However, the three works analyzed here collectively reveal that power functions by producing and organizing freedom rather than by eliminating it. Rather than being merely obedient subjects, human beings are reconfigured as individuals who voluntarily manage, optimize, and regulate themselves according to the system’s norms. Thus, governmentality is not merely a technology of control, but rather, a form of power that encourages individuals to constitute themselves as governable subjects.

The structure of desire depicted in these three novels most clearly illustrates this transformation. In Brave New World, people obey because they are happy. In Neuromancer, individuals enter networks because they desire connectivity. In The Circle, people expose themselves because they seek recognition and participation. In other words, power in these texts is not imposed from the outside. Rather, it takes the form of positive values, such as happiness, freedom, connectivity, and transparency. These values encourage individuals to reproduce the logic of power themselves. From this perspective, this study reinterprets dystopian science fiction as not merely a genre that warns against the dangers of future societies, but also as a cultural apparatus that reveals how particular historical periods organize desire.

Furthermore, this study calls for a reconsideration of conventional approaches to reading dystopian fiction. Traditionally, dystopian criticism has focused on totalitarianism, surveillance, and technological oppression. However, these three novels suggest that the essence of power does not lie in surveillance itself, but rather in the processes through which human desires are shaped and directed. Consequently, the central issue of dystopia should not be whether technology monitors human beings but how technology structures the conditions under which desires and choices emerge. In this regard, the present study proposes the possibility of reading dystopian science fiction as a form of cultural genealogy that records the historical transformations of governmentality.

Furthermore, the arguments presented in this study have significant implications for modern environments influenced by artificial intelligence and algorithmic governance. Today, generative AI, recommendation algorithms, and predictive analytics systems do more than deliver information; they organize human attention, choices, and possibilities for action. Users may believe they are making free choices, but the conditions under which they make those choices may already be structured by data and algorithms. In this sense, contemporary AI systems can be understood as some of the most sophisticated forms of governmentality described by Foucault.

While Brave New World depicts a society that organizes desire and Neuromancer portrays a society that organizes connectivity, The Circle represents a society that organizes transparency. Today, generative AI and data-driven platforms are moving toward a ‘governmentality of prediction,’ anticipating and shaping future behaviors and desires in advance. The questions raised by dystopian science fiction remain highly relevant. The central issue of contemporary society is not whether individuals are being monitored but rather who determines what people desire and how those desires are shaped.

At the same time, the genealogy traced in these three novels should not be understood as a narrative of complete governmental success. Each text reveals moments that expose the limits of governance. For example, in Brave New World, John the Savage emphasizes the value of suffering over the logic of managed happiness. The autonomous artificial intelligences in Neuromancer surpass the regulatory capabilities of corporations and states alike. In The Circle, Mercer’s withdrawal from visibility demonstrates the difficulty of sustaining forms of life that refuse platform norms. These figures do not offer complete alternatives to governmentality. Rather, they reveal that no system of governance can eliminate contingency, resistance, or forms of subjectivity that exceed its organizing logic. Consequently, dystopian science fiction is significant not only because it exposes how modern power operates, but also because it reveals the tensions, contradictions, and instabilities that accompany every attempt to govern human conduct. Thus, the genealogy of technological governmentality is simultaneously a genealogy of its limits.

Ultimately, Brave New World, Neuromancer, and The Circle depict different technological environments across distinct historical periods. Yet, they converge in revealing that modern power’s essence lies not in external coercion, but in producing self-governance. Thus, dystopian science fiction is more than just a genre of technological critique or future prediction. Rather, it serves as a critical cultural text that invites reflection on how human freedom and desire are organized and managed in modern society. Dystopian science fiction provides an important theoretical and ethical resource for understanding today’s data-driven society and the age of artificial intelligence precisely at this point.

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Desire, Connectivity, and Transparency:
The Evolution of Foucauldian Governmentality in Dystopian Science Fiction

Abstract

Mijeong Kim

This article examines how dystopian science fiction narrates the historical transformation of technological power through Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality. While previous studies of dystopian fiction have focused primarily on totalitarianism, surveillance, and repressive power, this study argues that contemporary power increasingly operates through the organization of desire, voluntary participation, and self-management rather than external coercion. To explore this shift, the article comparatively analyzes Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, William Gibson’s Neuromancer, and Dave Eggers’s The Circle. The three novels represent distinct stages in the evolution of governmentality: biopolitical governance, information-network governance, and platform-based self-governance. Brave New World depicts a society in which desire and emotion are regulated through pleasure, consumption, and psychological conditioning. Neuromancer presents cyberspace and data networks as new structures of governance in a late-capitalist information society. The Circle portrays a platform society in which transparency and participation become internalized ethical values, leading individuals to voluntarily perform self-surveillance. Rather than treating these works merely as technological dystopias, this article interprets them as genealogical texts tracing the movement of modern power from external discipline to self-governance.

Key Words

governmentality, biopolitics, technological power, dystopian science fiction, platform surveillance, self-governance

김미정

경상국립대학교 영어영문학부 부교수

영미문학연구
Journal of English Studies in Korea
50 (2026): -102
http://doi.org/10.46562/jesk.50.3